Vulnerabilities exploitable today
16,519in current view
Single score combining CVSS, KEV membership and EPSS. Every CVE with its own record — timeline from publication to active exploitation.
In KEV catalog1,754
New KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,666
Distribution · last window
- Critical3,400
- High15,532
- Medium14,795
- Low1,422
Filters
Window
Severity
Flags
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-98371—5.0%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len
When the start of an inner packet is split across two outer packets
such that fewer than 4 bytes land at the end of the first one,
__input_process_payload() saves those bytes as a runt and skips the
iplen/iphlen validation performed for in-place packets. When the
continuation packet arrives, iptfs_reassem_cont() only requires the
declared inner length to be >= sizeof(ra_runt) (6) before allocating
the reassembly skb with that attacker-controlled length.
However, __iptfs_iphlen() always returns the fixed minimum IP header
size (20 for IPv4, 40 for IPv6), so for an inner IPv4 tot_len in
[6, 19] the header-completion copy writes past the declared packet
length, and the subsequent "ipremain -= copylen" underflows to ~4GB,
leaving the payload copy length bounded only by blkoff (up to 64KB).
At runtime the skb_put() tailroom check turns this into
skb_over_panic(), i.e. an unprivileged kernel panic (DoS), reachable
locally via userns+netns IPTFS SAs and remotely against IPTFS VPN
gateways when the decrypted outer skb is linear (e.g. AF_PACKET taps,
tun/tap delivery).
Align the runt path with the normal path by requiring the declared
inner length to cover at least the IP header size. This also subsumes
the previous >= sizeof(ra_runt) check, since the minimum IP header
is always larger than the runt buffer.
This issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at
Tencent Yunding Lab.4dCVE-2026-98370—6.2%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: fix compat ALLOCSPI request use-after-free
xfrm_state_netlink() builds the ALLOCSPI response with
dump_one_state(), which already calls alloc_compat() with the response
skb and header.
xfrm_alloc_userspi() then calls alloc_compat() again, but passes the
original request skb and its header. For a compat request, the
translator therefore interprets the 228-byte compat xfrm_userspi_info
as the 232-byte native layout and reads four bytes past the declared
payload. It also publishes the translated child through the request's
frag_list.
A multicast clone of the request shares skb_shared_info and can observe
that child. xfrm_user_rcv_msg() frees it after the request handler
returns, racing a compat receiver which may still be copying from it and
resulting in a use-after-free.
Remove the redundant conversion. The response keeps its correct compat
translation from dump_one_state(), and no child is attached to the
inbound request.4dCVE-2026-983697.8 HIG3.5%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: add missing rcu_read_lock(), skb_dst_force() and dev_hold() for xfrm_trans_reinject()
syzbot reported a suspicious RCU usage warning in ip6_pkt_drop():
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in ip6_pkt_drop
include/net/addrconf.h:389 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
Call Trace:
__in6_dev_get_safely include/net/addrconf.h:389 [inline]
ip6_pkt_drop+0x596/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:4620
ip6_pkt_discard+0x1c/0x30 net/ipv6/route.c:4651
xfrm_trans_reinject+0x324/0x630 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:806
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
When commit 4f4920669d21 ("xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through
workqueue") converted xfrm_trans_reinject from a tasklet to a workqueue,
the reinjection loop ceased running in softirq context. Workqueue workers
run in process context where local_bh_disable() does not enter an RCU
read-side critical section under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU.
Because finish callbacks (such as ip6_rcv_finish) expect to run under an
RCU read lock (performing route lookups, l3mdev lookups, and accessing
RCU-protected data structures), invoking them in workqueue context without
rcu_read_lock() triggers RCU lockdep warnings.
Furthermore, packets queued to the workqueue via xfrm_trans_queue_net()
may carry non-refcounted (noref) dst entries (e.g. from ip_route_input_noref).
Additionally, on netdevice unregistration, dst_dev_put() replaces dst->dev
with blackhole_netdev, so dst entries do not keep skb->dev alive while
queued in the workqueue.
Fix these issues by:
1. Calling skb_dst_force(skb) in xfrm_trans_queue_net() while still in the
caller's RCU section to ensure dst is reference-counted before queuing.
2. Holding a reference on skb->dev via dev_hold()/dev_put() across workqueue
deferral so skb->dev remains valid during finish() callback processing.
3. Acquiring rcu_read_lock() around the finish callback invocation loop in
xfrm_trans_reinject().4dCVE-2026-983687.8 HIG2.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: downgrade zerocopy managed frags before mutating skb frags
On the out-of-place output path (esp->inplace == false) ESP rewrites the
skb frag array: esp_output_head() appends a trailer frag and
esp_output_tail() replaces the frags with a destination page, both
referenced with get_page().
When the skb carries zerocopy managed frags (SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS) the
payload frags are owned by the ubuf and must not be referenced or
unreferenced individually, but ESP mutates the frag array without ever
downgrading the skb. This breaks the managed-frag invariant two ways:
- esp_ssg_unref() walks the source scatterlist and drops a page
reference for every frag, including the ubuf-owned payload frags,
pushing their refcount below the GUP pin bias while the pages are
still pinned, i.e. a use-after-free of the zerocopy pages;
- esp_output_tail() installs its destination page as frag 0 with
get_page() but leaves SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS set, so
skb_release_data() takes the skip_unref branch and never drops that
reference, leaking the x->xfrag page at packet rate.
Fix this the way every other frag-mutating site does (__ip_append_data(),
__ip6_append_data(), tcp_sendmsg_locked()) and call
skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() before ESP touches the frag array: it takes
a real reference on each existing frag and clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS,
so the per-frag unref in esp_ssg_unref() and the frag release in
skb_release_data() are both balanced and no mixed-ownership frag array is
left behind.4dCVE-2026-983677.8 HIG2.3%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Clear association under lock if siw_qp_modify fails in siw_accept
We need to clear cep before release state_lock as siw_qp_llp_close and
siw_qp_modify->siw_qp_llp_close did.
Otherwise if siw_qp_modify() fails in siw_accept(), the QP's state_lock
is released before the error path cleanup. A concurrent ibv_modify_qp()
transitioning the QP to ERROR can race in this window:
siw_accept() ibv_modify_qp(ERROR)
---------------------- ----------------------
siw_qp_modify() fails
up_write(&qp->state_lock)
down_write(&qp->state_lock)
nextstate_from_idle():
if (qp->cep)
siw_cep_put(qp->cep) <- frees cep
qp->cep = NULL
goto error
cep->qp = NULL <- UAF
Clear qp->cep and drop the association reference taken by siw_cep_get(),
all under the write lock held from the initial down_write(&qp->state_lock).
Thread B therefore sees qp->cep == NULL, skips its own put, and cannot free
the cep before siw_accept() is done with it.4dCVE-2026-983667.8 HIG1.5%
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD
rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then
validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:
if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
rxe_put(old_pd);
rxe_get(pd);
mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd;
}
if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
mr->access = access;
}
Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is
IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access
check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned.
mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the
success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error
without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts
still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements
new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references
it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup()
writes to freed memory:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591
__rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200
__rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370
rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80
Allocated by task 591:
ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540
Freed by task 591:
ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210
uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0
ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0
Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either
applies every requested change or none.4dCVE-2026-983659.8 CRI30.9%
——9In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the
registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)
A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length
wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the
check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only
guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences
mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel
oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.
Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee
that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
length > mr->ibmr.length ||
iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length)
With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and
the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB.4dCVE-2026-983647.8 HIG1.8%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: hold net_device reference under RCU in bundle creation
xfrm_bundle_create() and xfrm_create_dummy_bundle() read dst->dev into
a local pointer without taking a device reference, then pass it to
xfrm_fill_dst(). A concurrent RTM_DELLINK replaces dst->dev via
dst_dev_put() and frees the old net_device, causing a use-after-free
when xfrm6_fill_dst() later dereferences the stale dev pointer.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm6_fill_dst+0x82c/0x860
(net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:86 netdev_hold())
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880142fe588 by task exploit/153
Call Trace:
xfrm6_fill_dst+0x82c/0x860
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x21d4/0x2bd0
xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x485/0x1640
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x19b/0x1e0
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1443/0x2dd0
Fix this by reading dst->dev via dst_dev_rcu() and keeping the RCU
read-side critical section active until xfrm_fill_dst() has taken the
required device references.4dCVE-2026-98363—6.3%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scpi: reject DVFS OPP count above MAX_DVFS_OPPS
scpi_dvfs_get_info() already rejected a zero opp_count, but still trusted
any larger value from the SCP firmware. The shared-memory reply only holds
MAX_DVFS_OPPS entries in buf.opps[]; a bigger count over-reads that array
and then sizes the allocated OPP table incorrectly (garbage OPPs / OOB).
The missing upper bound dates back to the original SCPI DVFS support.
Reject zero and out-of-range counts in one check and return -EINVAL.4dCVE-2026-98362—6.3%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: scpi: bound-check DVFS index in scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate
dvfs_get_idx() may return an out-of-range index if the SCP firmware is
buggy or returns a stale value. Only negative indexes were rejected, so a
large index walked past info->opps and could treat garbage as a clock rate
(KASAN OOB / wrong frequency to consumers). The missing upper bound dates
back to the original SCPI clock driver.
Treat indexes >= opp count as invalid and return 0, same as idx < 0.4dCVE-2026-983617.8 HIG2.2%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Restore HMM_PFN_WRITE check in ODP write paths
Commit 0b261d7c1cd3 ("RDMA/rxe: Break endless pagefault loop for RO
pages") dropped the access permission test from rxe_check_pagefault()
and left only HMM_PFN_VALID. A page faulted in read-only, for example
a page-cache folio behind a PROT_READ file mapping, then satisfies the
check and ODP write operations (RDMA WRITE, RDMA READ response, SEND
payload, atomics) modify it through kmap without ever breaking CoW.
An unprivileged user can register an ODP MR over such a mapping and
have incoming RDMA traffic overwrite the page cache of a file it only
holds O_RDONLY, including /etc/passwd or setuid binaries. This is the
same primitive class as Dirty COW and CVE-2022-2590.
mlx5 has the missing invariant: its ODP path sets the device write bit
only for pfns that carry HMM_PFN_WRITE. Restore it in rxe by requiring
HMM_PFN_WRITE in rxe_check_pagefault() for every operation except
RXE_PAGEFAULT_RDONLY. A write to a non-writable VMA now fails the one
fault attempt with -EPERM from hmm_vma_fault() instead of re-faulting
forever. For a writable VMA the fault breaks CoW and the write lands
in the private page.
Keep pmem flushes on the read-only check. arch_wb_cache_pmem() never
modifies memory, and the FLUSH access bits do not make the umem
writable, so classifying flushes as writes would make every flush
against a flush-only MR fail.4dCVE-2026-983607.0 HIG2.4%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: insert mcg into mcg_tree only after rxe_mcast_add() succeeds
rxe_get_mcg() publishes a newly allocated multicast group in
rxe->mcg_tree before programming the backing Ethernet multicast address
with rxe_mcast_add(), which runs outside mcg_lock. A local userspace
RDMA client reaches this path with ATTACH_MCAST on a UD QP; if
rxe_mcast_add() then returns an error (for example -ENODEV when the
backing netdev has been removed, or a propagated dev_mc_add() error),
the unwind frees the published group without removing it from the tree.
A later lookup of the same MGID dereferences the freed struct rxe_mcg
from __rxe_lookup_mcg().
Fix this by keeping the new mcg private until rxe_mcast_add() succeeds.
Split the tree publication into __rxe_publish_mcg(), call rxe_mcast_add()
before taking the tree reference, and free the still-private mcg on
failure. Because the group is never visible in mcg_tree until the
multicast address is programmed, no concurrent caller can look it up or
attach a QP to a group that is about to be torn down, so the error path
needs no conditional unwind. If another caller publishes the same MGID
while the address is being programmed, the post-add re-check under
mcg_lock finds the winner; this caller then drops its private object and
balances its own rxe_mcast_add() with rxe_mcast_del() before returning
the winner.
Reproduced by forcing the rxe_mcast_add() error return under KASAN:
without the change the next attach to the same MGID reports a
slab-use-after-free in __rxe_lookup_mcg(); with it the forced failure
returns cleanly. A no-injection attach/detach regression, including a
two-QP shared join/leave and re-attach, stays KASAN- and leak-clean.4dCVE-2026-983597.0 HIG1.8%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Reject unregistering netdevs in ib_get_eth_speed
ib_device_get_netdev() intentionally returns a referenced net_device even
when it is unregistering, so matching and cleanup callers can still find
the association. The reference keeps struct net_device allocated, but does
not guarantee that the device remains operational.
ib_get_eth_speed() uses the returned device operationally by invoking its
ethtool callback. Although that call is made under RTNL, the function does
not verify the registration state first. An asynchronous RDMA port query
can therefore call into a netdev after NETDEV_UNREGISTER and ndo_uninit
have completed.
Check for NETREG_REGISTERED while holding RTNL and return -ENODEV for a
device which is being unregistered. Keeping RTNL across the check and the
ethtool operation prevents unregister from starting between them.
Keep the speed fallback and warning under RTNL as well, so the warning can
safely read netdev->name. Drop the netdev reference before releasing RTNL
once all accesses to the device are complete.4dCVE-2026-98358—5.4%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/iser: reject a remote invalidation of an unregistered direction
A write command whose data is sent entirely as immediate data is not
registered. iser_reg_mem_fastreg() takes the DMA key path and leaves
rdma_reg[ISER_DIR_OUT].desc at NULL, while iser_dma_map_task_data() has
already set dir[ISER_DIR_OUT].
iser_check_remote_inv() looks at dir[] alone and hands the descriptor to
iser_inv_desc(), which reads desc->sig_protected. A target that answers
such a command with IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV faults the initiator.
Leaving those commands unregistered is deliberate.
The same function already terminates the connection when a target sends
a remote invalidation the initiator did not ask for. A target that
invalidates a direction that was never registered is in the same class,
so give it the same answer.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISERHOST-gf5098b6bae76-dirty #3 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
RIP: 0010:iser_task_rsp+0x6d6/0xec0
Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 ba 06 00 00 48 8b 9b 78 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 76 06 00 00 80 7b 20 00 0f 84 3d 04
RSP: 0018:ffff88811b008db8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000001848
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 1ffff11021587b12 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffff88810adc1ae4 R08: ffff888109b7f860 R09: ffffffff90a922c0
R10: ffff88810adc1a1c R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888109b7f800
R13: ffff88810adc1acc R14: ffff888109b7f820 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88818a676000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000005afe2b CR3: 000000010af23005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_poll_handler+0x6e/0x200
irq_poll_softirq+0x1df/0x480
? clockevents_program_event+0x2ba/0x860
? __pfx_irq_poll_softirq+0x10/0x10
handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x156/0x450
do_softirq+0x3b/0x60
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70
__alloc_skb+0x732/0x890
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10
? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x50
rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0
prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830
rxe_receiver+0x499/0x9980
? __pfx_rxe_receiver+0x10/0x10
? rxe_completer+0x29e5/0x38c0
? hrtimer_start_range_ns_common+0x75f/0x1730
? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0xa6/0x2c0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_rxe_receiver+0x10/0x10
do_work+0x144/0x470
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
? assign_work+0x11d/0x370
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---4dCVE-2026-983578.1 HIG28.3%
——8In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: wait for deferred control PDU completions before releasing the connection
isert_send_done() hands ISTATE_SEND_TASKMGTRSP, ISTATE_SEND_REJECT and
ISTATE_SEND_TEXTRSP completions off to isert_comp_wq and returns. The work
item then runs isert_completion_put() -> isert_put_cmd(), which reads
isert_conn->conn and takes conn->cmd_lock.
Nothing orders that work item against teardown. isert_wait_conn() queues
isert_release_work, which frees isert_conn, and iscsit_close_connection()
frees the iscsit_conn right after it returns, so the queued work can run
against freed memory.
Count the deferred control PDU completions per connection and let
isert_wait_conn() wait for them before the release work is queued.
ISTATE_SEND_LOGOUTRSP is deliberately not counted: that branch runs
iscsit_logout_post_handler(), which ends up waiting for
conn->conn_wait_comp, and that completion is only sent by
iscsit_close_connection() after it has called iscsit_wait_conn().
Waiting for it here would deadlock. Its wait stays the existing
isert_wait4logout().
The splat below is from a kernel with tracing printk()s and an msleep(200)
injected into isert_do_control_comp() to widen the window:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881054f1038 by task kworker/u17:1/182
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 182 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G B 7.2.0-rc5-TWIDE-gb8babf08acc7 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: isert_comp_wq isert_do_control_comp
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x70
? isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
? isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
isert_put_cmd+0x53d/0x620
? isert_completion_put+0x305/0x330
? isert_do_control_comp+0x2ef/0x310
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
? assign_work+0x11d/0x370
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 48:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370
isert_cma_handler+0x1e3/0x2ae0
cma_cm_event_handler+0x3e/0x240
cma_ib_req_handler+0x17d9/0x4490
cm_process_work+0x41/0x330
cm_work_handler+0x5727/0xc160
process_one_work+0x633/0x1030
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 184:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x121/0x380
iscsit_close_connection+0x7cf/0x1e60
iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit+0x1b6/0x360
iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x472/0x690
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0
ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x304dCVE-2026-98356—5.0%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: check create_singlethread_workqueue() in DCB setup
bnxt_re_init_dcb_wq() ignores a failed allocation. The async DCB
handler later calls queue_work() on the NULL pointer.4dCVE-2026-98355—3.9%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs: guard against null kobj name
In the client, if `init_path()` errors, the callee tries to clean up
with `rtrs_clt_close_conns()`. However, this can lead to calling the
event tracing code with `clt_path->kobj->name` being `NULL` and thus
causing a null pointer dereference when trying to copy from it.
This just adds a guard to check that the name is not `NULL` before
copying from it. The server appears to have a similar pattern.4dCVE-2026-98354—6.2%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails
ib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list and then runs
ib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On
failure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees
the ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still
empty at that point, nothing is freed at all.
The caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL
right after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took
ownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore
leaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA),
and a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a
wrong PKey.
Link recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the
error path has something to free.4dCVE-2026-98353—3.9%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for QP and CQ tables
Locked QP and CQ lookups from EQ interrupts can deadlock with
create-path XArray updates. If an interrupt arrives while the create
path holds the plain xa_lock, the lookup spins forever trying to
acquire the same lock.
Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for all QP and CQ create-path updates,
including the GSI QP store and error paths. Initialize both arrays with
XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ so sleeping allocations preserve interrupt state.4dCVE-2026-98352—5.8%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs-clt: Fix CQ pool leak when connect is interrupted
The client borrows shared CQ credits in the ADDR_RESOLVED handler via
ib_cq_pool_get(), before the peer is connected. create_cm() can return
-ERESTARTSYS from wait_event_interruptible_timeout() without destroying
the CM ID. The init_conns() and stop-and-destroy paths then call
destroy_con_cq_qp() while cq is still NULL (no PUT) and only afterwards
rdma_destroy_id().
CMA serializes the handler against rdma_destroy_id() with handler_mutex,
but that does not order the GET against destroy_con_cq_qp(). If
ADDR_RESOLVED has already passed the DESTROYING check, it can take
con_mutex, GET credits, and then lose the con to kfree. Device
unregister later hits WARN_ON(cq->cqe_used) in ib_cq_pool_cleanup().
Set a per-connection flag under con_mutex before CQ/QP teardown so a
racing ADDR_RESOLVED cannot borrow credits after teardown has begun.4dCVE-2026-98351—6.3%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: virt_wifi: free skb when disconnected
When the simulated link is disconnected, virt_wifi_start_xmit() returns
NET_XMIT_DROP without freeing the skb. dev_hard_start_xmit() treats this
return value as consumed, so every packet sent while disconnected leaks its
skb.
Free the skb before returning the drop status.4dCVE-2026-98350—8.8%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: pass PMKID to firmware if present
Zero out auth_status on initialization. Otherwise, garbage will
leak from the stack to the firmware (when ssid is less than 32 bytes
and/or when params->pmkid is set). Then, pass the params->pmkid to the
firmware (without it, the firmware caches a garbage PMKID on successful
authentication and denies a subsequent association request that includes
the PMKID).4dCVE-2026-983497.1 HIG17.0%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses
libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.
libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as
stats->len - sizeof(*beacon)
stats->len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative. Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.
Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.
Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers. Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device.4dCVE-2026-983487.1 HIG16.9%
——5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject too-short association responses
libipw_handle_assoc_resp() reads the capability, status and aid fields
of the 30-byte association response prefix and then computes the
information element length as
stats->len - sizeof(*frame)
stats->len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative. Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() turns a
frame shorter than the fixed fields into a length near 64 KiB, and the
parser then reads past the receive buffer.
Both the ipw2100 and ipw2200 management receive paths reach this
function having established only that the frame carries the generic
24-byte three-address header.
Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.
Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers. Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device.4dCVE-2026-98347—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/IPoIB: Avoid restoring OPER_UP after multicast flush
ipoib_ib_dev_flush_light() temporarily clears IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to
prevent multicast joins while ipoib_mcast_dev_flush() is running, and
restores the flag afterwards if it was previously set.
This restore races with ipoib_ib_dev_down(). If the interface is brought
down while the flush is in progress, ipoib_ib_dev_down() clears
IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP, but the flush path may set it again after the device
has already gone down.
Since commit 894021a75291 ("IB/ipoib: Make the carrier_on_task race
aware"), ipoib_mcast_carrier_on_task() relies on IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP
being cleared to terminate its rtnl_trylock() retry loop. If the flag is
left set after shutdown, the workqueue retries forever, causing teardown
to deadlock when ipoib_ndo_uninit() waits in destroy_workqueue() while
holding RTNL.
Instead of overloading IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to block multicast joins
during a light flush, introduce a dedicated IPOIB_FLAG_MCAST_FLUSH flag.
Use it together with IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to determine whether multicast
joins are allowed, avoiding the race with device shutdown.4dCVE-2026-98346—6.7%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't get the radio mask for netdev-less wdevs
cfg80211_calculate_bi_data() calls rdev_get_radio_mask() with
wdev->netdev, which can be NULL and then crashes in mac80211.
To avoid that, invert the order of checks since wdev->netdev
is always valid for beaconing interfaces.4dCVE-2026-98345—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: check IP header size in cfg80211_classify8021d()
A frame that looks like IP can be transmitted, but be too short, so
the DS field is read incorrectly:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
ieee80211_select_queue+0x37a/0x9e0 net/mac80211/wme.c:180
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60f/0x1d90 net/mac80211/tx.c:4304
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa8/0x6d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:4538
...
packet_sendmsg+0x9173/0xa2a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
Use skb_header_pointer() like the MPLS case.4dCVE-2026-98344—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: Fix device kref underflow in dma_chan_put()
dma_chan_get() takes chan->device->ref only on the slow path:
/* no kref on fast path */
if (chan->client_count) {
__module_get(owner);
chan->client_count++;
return 0;
}
if (!try_module_get(owner))
return -ENODEV;
if (!dma_device_get(chan->device)) { // calls kref_get_unless_zero()
dma_chan_put() drops the ref unconditionally, so every fast-path
get/put pair drops one extra device reference.
The bug fires when two conditions hold together: a non-private
provider has a persistent client holding chan->client_count > 0
and another client cycles dmaengine_get()/dmaengine_put().
When the kref hits zero, the subsequent dma_find_channel() returns
NULL even though the provider module is still loaded.
Fix this by dropping device->ref only on the last put, matching the
single slow-path get.4dCVE-2026-98343—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref,
dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its
channels.
dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via
dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it:
slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0
Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319
Freed by task 6319:
kfree+0x225/0x470
dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0
dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160
Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing
module_put() does not need chan->device.4dCVE-2026-98342—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: wait for RCU readers before releasing dma_device
dma_issue_pending_all() walks the dma_device_list with
list_for_each_entry_rcu() under rcu_read_lock(). dma_device_release()
unlinks the device with list_del_rcu() and then calls
device->device_release() (which in many drivers, such as plx_dma.c,
directly calls kfree()).
Because there is no grace period between unlinking the device and
freeing it, concurrent RCU readers in dma_issue_pending_all() can
access the device after it has been freed.
The lockless walk originally relied on clients holding a dmaengine
reference to pin the provider module, and therefore the device, for as
long as they might traverse the list. Commit 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine:
Add reference counting to dma_device struct") decoupled the dma_device
lifetime from the module reference, so the device can now be released
while a reader is still walking the list.
Add synchronize_rcu() before the device is freed, so RCU readers are
guaranteed to have finished. Keep it unconditional: providers that do
not implement device_release() free the device themselves once
dma_async_device_unregister() returns. This call will delay for a grace
period with dma_list_mutex held, which is safe and only teardown path is
delayed.4dCVE-2026-983417.8 HIG2.8%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't free driver-owned scan requests
When an interface goes down while a scan is running, cfg80211 completes
the scan towards userspace and frees the scan request. However, the
driver can be convinced that it owns the request, since the cancellation
is (intended to be) asynchronous.
The WARN_ON() in the netdev notifier was meant to catch this, but it's
not actually avoidable, so it triggers and we get a UAF in scan_done().
There doesn't seem to be a great way around it, so just track that the
driver is still convinced it owns the request, and then just free it on
completion if it was already cancelled. Also remove the warnings since
they can trigger in the intended architecture.4dCVE-2026-98340—7.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: only group hidden BSSes with beacon entries
When a probe response for an unknown BSS comes in, __cfg80211_bss_update()
looks for an existing entry with the same BSSID and a hidden (zero-length
or NUL-filled) SSID, and if it finds one it groups them, using the beacon
IEs from the existing entry.
But that could find another entry without a beacon, if it was also from a
probe response (with SSID), so there's a group without beacon elements.
If a beacon with a hidden SSID for that BSSID arrives later,
cfg80211_combine_bsses() goes looking for the probe response entries that
belong to it - i.e. entries with the same BSSID and channel that have no
beacon IEs - and finds those two. They are already grouped with each
other, so it hits its
WARN_ON_ONCE(bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&bss->hidden_list))
which are there because an entry without beacon elements is not supposed
to be part of a group yet.
Only combine entries when a beacon was already received, ones that are
kept separate will be combined when a beacon arrives.4dCVE-2026-983398.8 HIG19.9%
——6In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't filter by BSS type when removing stale entries
When an assoc AP switches to a channel that already has a BSS entry,
cfg80211_update_assoc_bss_entry() removes that entry before rehashing
the real one, since the two would otherwise collide in the BSS rbtree.
The lookup for that entry also required it to match the connection's BSS
type, so an entry advertising e.g. the IBSS capability bit was left in
place, and the following cfg80211_rehash_bss() then ran into it:
WARN_ON(!cmp)
Changing the type shouldn't really happen, but can be triggered by a
rogue AP/device, so drop the check and remove any entries matching
the comparison.4dCVE-2026-98338—5.1%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: ibss: ref BSS entry for joined event
When the IBSS is joined, we only record the BSSID/channel in the event
and look up the BSS entry when processing it. However, that's racy,
e.g. a new scan with NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_FLUSH can remove it, causing a
warning in the event work:
!bss
WARNING: net/wireless/ibss.c:37 at __cfg80211_ibss_joined+0x3d3/0x440
Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_event_work
cfg80211_process_wdev_events+0x39f/0x5b0 net/wireless/util.c:1144
cfg80211_process_rdev_events+0xa1/0x110 net/wireless/util.c:1179
cfg80211_event_work+0x2f/0x40 net/wireless/core.c:393
Do the lookup early (the driver is expected to only join an IBSS that
has a BSS entry) and keep a reference to it.4dCVE-2026-98337—6.7%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't start a ROC while scanning
The ROC work can be pending when a scan starts (which requires
ROC list to be empty, but that's possible), and then a new ROC
can be added to the list and the work will pick it up.
Avoid starting that ROC if a scan made it between things, as
otherwise we'll hit a warning later:
WARNING: net/mac80211/offchannel.c:404 at ieee80211_start_next_roc+0x256/0x2d0
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work
Call Trace:
__ieee80211_scan_completed+0x4fd/0xe40 net/mac80211/scan.c:537
ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x1ff0 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x410/0x570 net/wireless/core.c:5134dCVE-2026-98336—6.7%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't offload TC setup on AP_VLAN interfaces
AP_VLAN interfaces are purely virtual, so don't try to offload
TC setup to drivers. We can't really use the AP interface either
since we may not know it all the time, and it could technically
even change.
Just reject the TC offload so things get done in software.4dCVE-2026-98335—6.7%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: abort chanswitch when leaving a mesh
The code in ieee80211_stop_mesh() leaves CSA active, but leaving
the mesh released the channel context, so the CSA finalize work
crashes:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000003
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_put_srates_elem+0x42/0x640 net/mac80211/util.c:3272
Call Trace:
ieee80211_mesh_build_beacon+0xa83/0x1b50 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1093
ieee80211_mesh_rebuild_beacon+0xc7/0x170 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1147
ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa+0x131/0x210 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1542
ieee80211_set_after_csa_beacon net/mac80211/cfg.c:4085 [inline]
__ieee80211_csa_finalize net/mac80211/cfg.c:4133 [inline]
ieee80211_csa_finalize+0x633/0x1150 net/mac80211/cfg.c:4155
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2ab/0x450 net/wireless/core.c:438
Abort the channel switch properly.4dCVE-2026-98334—6.7%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reset state when starting AP fails
ieee80211_start_ap() can set enable_beacon (and beacon_int) and fail
later, leaving it set forever. Scanning can then attempt to restore
beaconing on such an interface, leading to:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:mac80211_hwsim_link_info_changed+0xca7/0xf00
Call Trace:
drv_link_info_changed+0x413/0x860 net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:495
ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427
ieee80211_offchannel_return+0x381/0x580 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:160
__ieee80211_scan_completed+0x993/0xe30 net/mac80211/scan.c:519
ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x2010 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2b7/0x550 net/wireless/core.c:538
in hwsim. Also, cfg80211 then allows changing the interface type,
and the off-channel path getgs confused about beaconing as well,
leading to another warning:
WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:468 at drv_link_info_changed+0x583/0x880
ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427
ieee80211_offchannel_stop_vifs+0x328/0x5c0 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:122
ieee80211_start_sw_scan net/mac80211/scan.c:583 [inline]
__ieee80211_start_scan+0xfb6/0x1af0 net/mac80211/scan.c:882
Reset the state on failures to always have it correct.4dCVE-2026-98333—5.1%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reset the LED state when ifup fails
When the first interface comes up, the radio LED is turned on. This can
start the TPT trigger timer, which continues running.
But if bringing up the interface fails then the timer keeps running and
won't be stopped by anything, eventually it can be freed:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff888127e12130 object type: timer_list hint: tpt_trig_timer+0x0/0x300 net/mac80211/led.c:145
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5923 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1a2/0x2b0
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x4b7/0x600 lib/debugobjects.c:1129
kfree+0x436/0x670 mm/slub.c:6818
ieee80211_led_exit+0x162/0x1c0 net/mac80211/led.c:210
ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x27e/0x3a0 net/mac80211/main.c:1706
rt2x00lib_remove_dev+0x55b/0x670
Undo the LED state in the error path.4dCVE-2026-98332—5.1%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: only operate on TDLS peers in the TDLS code
ieee80211_tdls_oper() can operate on the AP station, which then
yields various warnings when the AP station is removed then or
at a later point in time after being confused for a TDLS peer.
Always check that the station is a TDLS peer.4d