CVE-2024-3596
RADIUS Protocol under RFC 2865 is susceptible to forgery attacks by a local attacker who can modify any valid Response (Access-Accept, Acces
CVSS
9.0
Crítico
EPSS
14.9%
p97
KEV
—
Exploit Today
29
0-100
Publicado: 9 jul 2024 · Última mod.: 15 oct 2026 · CWE-354 · CWE-924
14.9%EPSS · 30 días14.9%
2026-10-042026-11-01
RADIUS Protocol under RFC 2865 is susceptible to forgery attacks by a local attacker who can modify any valid Response (Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge) to any other response using a chosen-prefix collision attack against MD5 Response Authenticator signature.
- www.openwall.comhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/09/4
- cert-portal.siemens.comhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-723487.html
- cert-portal.siemens.comhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-794185.html
- datatracker.ietf.orghttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius/
- datatracker.ietf.orghttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2865
- networkradius.comhttps://networkradius.com/assets/pdf/radius_and_md5_collisions.pdf
- psirt.global.sonicwall.comhttps://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0014
- www.blastradius.failhttps://www.blastradius.fail/
- www.openwall.comhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/09/4
- datatracker.ietf.orghttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius/
- datatracker.ietf.orghttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2865
- networkradius.comhttps://networkradius.com/assets/pdf/radius_and_md5_collisions.pdf
- psirt.global.sonicwall.comhttps://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0014
- security.netapp.comhttps://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240822-0001/
- today.ucsd.eduhttps://today.ucsd.edu/story/computer-scientists-discover-vulnerabilities-in-a-popular-security-protocol
- www.blastradius.failhttps://www.blastradius.fail/
- www.kb.cert.orghttps://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/456537
- cert-portal.siemens.comhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-364175.html
- cert-portal.siemens.comhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-723487.html
- cert-portal.siemens.comhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-770770.html
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
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This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.6d