CVE-2026-16619
The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.8 does not correctly limit the number of second-factor verification attempts, tracking them a
CVSS
7.5
Alto
EPSS
0.2%
p14
KEV
—
Exploit Today
4
0-100
Publicado: 6 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 7 ago 2026 · CWE-307
0.2%EPSS · 30 días0.2%
2026-08-072026-08-11
The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.8 does not correctly limit the number of second-factor verification attempts, tracking them against a client-supplied identifier that is reissued on every login, allowing an attacker who already knows a user's password to guess the one-time code without limit and take over the account.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-663405.3 MED—
——0The Mira cloud authentication endpoints do not enforce per-account rate limiting, per-IP throttling, or account lockout after repeated failed login attempts. An attacker can use brute-force methods to obtain gain access to user accounts.14hCVE-2026-659487.3 ALT22.3%
——7UnixAuth lacks brute-force protection in Apache Ranger versions <= 2.8.0.
Note: UnixAuth is NOT a recommended option for production deployments.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.9.0, which fixes this issue.8hCVE-2026-480847.4 ALT28.9%
——9OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Versions prior to 1.0.2 don't throttle failed passphrase login attempts. An attacker can submit unlimited wrong passphrase guesses against any known email address, capped only by the Argon2 verification cost (about 100 milliseconds per attempt on the tested host, giving 10 attempts per second sustained). The same backend implements a working per-account throttle on the WebAuthn challenge endpoint, which returns HTTP 429 after roughly 19 attempts. The passphrase branch simply does not invoke that throttle, leaving a supported high-value login path unprotected against credential stuffing and dictionary attacks. The asymmetry confirms this is an oversight rather than a design choice. The throttle infrastructure exists, is wired into the same auth backend, and works on the WebAuthn path. The passphrase branch in `/api/auth/login` was not updated to record failed attempts. Combined with the application's minimum-passphrase policy (12 characters, no entropy or dictionary checks), accounts using common base patterns such as `Spring2026!XX` or words from a leak corpus are realistically reachable in days on a single CPU, hours on a small GPU farm. Version 1.0.2 patches the issue.5dCVE-2026-480715.8 MED30.8%
——9OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the PIN-type challenge throttle uses `emailHash` as the only key. The throttle rows live in the central `challenge_throttle` table, which is shared across all tenants. Every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/verify-challenge` endpoint increments the same row when a PIN response fails, and every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/challenge` endpoint reads the same row when deciding whether to issue a new challenge. When the same `emailHash` exists in multiple tenants on the same OpenReception instance (the same patient holding tunnels in two different clinics that share the platform), an attacker who knows the patient's email can lock out that patient on tenant B by issuing failed challenge responses against tenant A. The attacker needs no relationship to tenant B; the lockout propagates through the shared throttle row. The lockout escalates with repeated failures. The first lockout triggers at 4 failed attempts and lasts approximately 60 seconds. Subsequent failures escalate the lockout duration to 5 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes per the throttle service's escalation logic. Repeated bursts produce sustained denial of service against the targeted email. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.5dCVE-2026-712139.1 CRÍ24.8%
——7Typemill's login endpoint (POST /tm/login, ControllerWebAuth::login) performs no rate-limiting, failed-attempt counting, or account lockout when captcha is disabled, which is the default configuration. An unauthenticated attacker can send unlimited password-guessing requests against any account, including administrators, with no throttling.3dCVE-2026-712056.5 MED5.6%
——2changedetection.io's /login route checks the submitted password against a single PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with no per-IP or per-session rate limiting, failed-attempt counter, or lockout (no rate-limiting library is present in requirements.txt).3d