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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-98606—11.3%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: release the GEM object on virtio_gpu_vram_create() errors
virtio_gpu_vram_create() frees the object with a bare kfree(vram) on
both error paths after drm_gem_private_object_init() has run, and on the
second one after drm_gem_create_mmap_offset() has linked obj->vma_node
into the device's VMA offset manager. The freed object stays in that
interval tree, so a later lookup or insertion walks freed memory, and
the dma_resv and gpuva lock are never destroyed.
Call drm_gem_object_release() before kfree() on both paths.9dCVE-2026-98605—6.0%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: fix TE GPIO lifetime for host attach
When the Exynos DSI driver was generalized into samsung-dsim, the TE
GPIO acquisition was switched from gpiod_get_optional() to
devm_gpiod_get_optional() while keeping the matching gpiod_put() calls.
That combination is wrong for a managed descriptor.
However, dropping the puts and keeping the managed get is also wrong:
samsung_dsim_register_te_irq() runs from the DSI host attach callback,
and host detach/reattach can happen without destroying the device that
owns the managed action. A second attach would then request the GPIO
again without having released it.
Switch back to a non-managed gpiod_get_optional() and keep the explicit
gpiod_put() on the request_irq() error path and in
samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq().
[Luca: remove unnecessary comment]9dCVE-2026-98604—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: replace bind when learning local endpoint
struct ovpn_bind is published through peer->bind with RCU, but local
endpoint learning updates bind->local in place under peer->lock. UDP TX
reads the field without that lock. In particular, a concurrent IPv6
update can therefore result in a torn address read.
Use ovpn_peer_reset_sockaddr to publish a replacement bind when learning
a new local endpoint, just as a remote endpoint change does. Preserve
the current remote address and reset the dst cache only after the new
bind has been published successfully.
Track remote endpoint changes separately so that float notification and
transport-address rehashing remain limited to actual peer floats.9dCVE-2026-98603—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source
The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered
source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read
locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn
address.
Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without
modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and
route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish
a replacement bind with a wildcard local address.
Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing
the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while
dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU
slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind
allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair.9dCVE-2026-98602—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing:
1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c),
use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte,
filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and
return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to
Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow.
2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >=
ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet
header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short
AF_PACKET TX frames.9dCVE-2026-98601—10.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate device-supplied DMA indices
In btintel_pcie_msix_rx_handle(), the driver processes RX completion
descriptors (urbd1) written by the PCIe device into DMA-coherent memory.
urbd1->frbd_tag (a 16-bit field fully controlled by the device firmware
via DMA) is used directly as an array index into rxq->bufs[] without any
bounds check. rxq->bufs[] has only BTINTEL_PCIE_RX_DESCS_COUNT (64)
entries, while frbd_tag can be any value 0-65535. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can write an out-of-range frbd_tag, causing the
driver to dereference an out-of-bounds data_buf pointer.
Additionally, cr_hia is read from a DMA-shared index array also writable
by the device; if the device sets cr_hia >= rxq->count, the while-loop
never terminates because cr_tia is wrapped via modulo rxq->count and can
never equal an out-of-range cr_hia.
Add bounds validation for cr_hia and frbd_tag in the RX path, and cr_hia
in the TX path. Log invalid values with bt_dev_err before returning.9dCVE-2026-98600—7.2%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()
While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least
sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame
with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte
header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2).
When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives:
1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false).
2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3.
3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns
NULL without advancing skb->data.
4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled
3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as
application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer
control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0.
Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also
require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len).9dCVE-2026-98599—8.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject non-negative offsets in stack_slot_obj_get_spi()
bpf_get_spi() computes (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE using C division,
which truncates toward zero. For off == 0, this produces spi 0, the
same index used by the valid stack slot at fp-8.
stack_slot_obj_get_spi() currently checks alignment and the resulting
spi bounds, but does not reject the non-negative offset itself. It can
therefore validate a PTR_TO_STACK register holding fp+0 against an
iterator stored at fp-8 even though the runtime receives the actual fp+0
pointer. An effectful iterator kfunc can then interpret memory outside
the BPF stack as iterator state.
Reject non-negative offsets before converting the offset to an spi. All
valid stack objects begin at a negative offset from the frame pointer.9dCVE-2026-98598—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Prevent rt6_insert_exception() for dying fib6_info.
Before the cited commit, fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() always set
from->exception_bucket_flushed = 1 under rt6_exception_lock to
prevent rt6_insert_exception() from inserting a new exception
for a dying fib6_info.
The flag was replaced with the FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED
bit stored in nh->rt6i_exception_bucket.
The problem is that now the bit is only set when the bucket
is not NULL and fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() is called from
fib6_nh_release() after fib6_ref has already reached zero.
If rt6_insert_exception() is called while the target fib6_info
is being removed via fib6_purge_rt(), a new exception could be
created successfully because rt6_flush_exceptions() no longer
sets the bit.
This creates a reference cycle between the fib6_info and the
exception route, leaking the fib6_info, its nexthop device,
and all per-CPU routes in fib6_nh->rt6i_pcpu, which stalls netdev
unregistration.
[ 34.680602] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68
[ 44.920675] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68
[ 55.176582] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68
Let's call fib6_drop_pcpu_from() before rt6_flush_exceptions(),
to set fib6_destroying before rt6_exception_lock, and check
f6i->fib6_destroying in rt6_insert_exception().
Note that FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED logic is dead and
we can clean it up in net-next.9dCVE-2026-98597—7.2%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: sr9700: include receive overhead in the length check
The receive fixup subtracts the Ethernet CRC from the reported packet
length, but compares that payload length against the whole remaining
receive buffer. The following copy starts after the three-byte header,
and the cursor advance consumes both that header and the four-byte CRC.
Require the payload to fit after SR_RX_OVERHEAD before copying it or
advancing to the next packet. The loop already ensures that the
remaining buffer is larger than the overhead, so the subtraction is
safe.
The issue was found by our static-analysis tool.9dCVE-2026-98596—10.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix dst leak for uncached routes.
ip6_route_output_flags(), ip6_rt_put_flags(), and ip6_dst_check()
detect an uncached route by list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached),
which replaced the static DST_NOCACHE flag check in commit
a4c2fd7f7891 ("net: remove DST_NOCACHE flag").
When a device is unregistered, rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev()
unlinks uncached routes tied to the device from rt6_uncached_list.
Previously, they were moved to another list with list_move()
(__list_del_entry() + list_add()), and since commit 98aa546af5e4
("inet: remove (struct uncached_list)->quarantine"), the routes
are just unlinked with list_del_init().
If list_del_init() runs concurrently, list_empty() evaluates to
true; ip6_route_output_flags() calls dst_hold_safe() incorrectly
and ip6_rt_put_flags() skips ip6_rt_put(), leaking dst, and thus
dev tied via rt->from as well.
The same race is partially fixed by commit 9a6f0c4d5796 ("dst:
fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()").
Let's check rt6->dst.rt_uncached_list instead.
Note that IPv4 does not have the same issue.9dCVE-2026-98595—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table
A UDP socket bound to a specific address and port keeps its entry in the
4-tuple hash table after it is disconnected:
sk binds to 127.0.0.1:21001
sk connects to 127.0.0.2:20001 // filed in the 4-tuple table
sk disconnects, connect(AF_UNSPEC) // still filed, peer now 0.0.0.0:0
__udp_disconnect() takes a socket out of that table only as a side effect
of ->rehash() or ->unhash(), and it skips ->rehash() when
SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK is set and ->unhash() when SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK is set.
commit 6996a2d2d0a6 ("udp: Unhash auto-bound connected sk from 4-tuple hash
table when disconnected.") fixed the same end state for a wildcard-bound
socket, by a path this one does not take.
The entry is counted whether or not anything hits it. hash4_cnt on the
hash2 slot stays raised for as long as the socket lives, so udp_has_hash4()
keeps sending every packet for that address and port through the 4-tuple
lookup first.
On IPv6 it can also be hit. __udp_disconnect() does not clear sk_v6_daddr,
so udp_v6_rehash() files the entry under the peer the socket was connected
to with a zero dport, and inet6_match() compares that same
field: a datagram from the former peer with a zero source port matches,
and source port zero is accepted on receive. On IPv4 the peer is cleared,
so a match would need a zero source address as well, which the routing
layer rejects as martian. The stale sk_v6_daddr is a separate defect, not
addressed here; removing the entry closes this path either way.
The entry can also be relocated. __udp_disconnect() clears sk_bound_dev_if,
so a subsequent SO_BINDTODEVICE calls ->rehash(), and because the receive
address is still specific udp_lib_rehash() moves the entry instead of
removing it, into the bucket that (rcv_saddr, num, 0, 0) hashes to -- a
pure function of the address and port, so every socket reaching this state
on one address and port collects in one bucket. The bucket cannot be chosen
from outside, as udp_ehashfn() is seeded with a per-boot secret. This last
one became reachable only with commit 644f9108f3a5 ("udp: Make rehash4
independent in udp_lib_rehash()"), which moved the hash4 handling out of a
branch a disconnected socket does not take; the stale entry itself dates
from the commit in Fixes.
Take the socket out of the table before __udp_disconnect() runs, while it
still matches how it was filed. This also reaches the wildcard case ahead
of udp_lib_rehash()'s udp_unhash4() branch, leaving that branch unreachable
from udp_disconnect(); removing it belongs in net-next. udp_disconnect()
and udp_abort() are the only UDP entries into __udp_disconnect(), which is
shared with raw, ping and l2tp sockets that are not struct udp_sock:
ping_prot.obj_size is sizeof(struct inet_sock), so udp_hashed4() on one
would read past the allocation.9dCVE-2026-98594—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tg3: clean up PHYLIB resources on probe failure
tg3_get_invariants() can register an MDIO bus and connect a PHY for
USE_PHYLIB devices. If tg3_init_one() later fails, its common error path
releases the mappings and netdev without undoing those PHYLIB resources.
Disconnect the PHY and unregister the MDIO bus before the remaining
teardown. Guard PHY cleanup with USE_PHYLIB to match tg3_phy_init(), and
call tg3_mdio_fini() unconditionally to match tg3_mdio_init(). The existing
IS_CONNECTED and MDIOBUS_INITED flags make both helpers safe when
initialization only completed partially.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while
reviewing kernel code.9dCVE-2026-98593—6.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/debug: Fix NULL pointer dereference in debug_info_copy()
When debug_register_static() fails, it clears areas, active_pages and
active_entries but leaves the area bounds unchanged. Copying such an
area, either by opening its view file or via debug_dump(), makes
debug_info_copy() dereference the NULL pointers.
Skip the copy loop when the source has no areas.9dCVE-2026-98592—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: spacemit: clear TX descriptor on fragment mapping failure
emac_tx_mem_map() writes TX_DESC_0_OWN into the ring descriptor for
every slot beyond old_head as soon as that slot's memset()'d local
copy is committed with "*tx_desc_addr = tx_desc", i.e. before the
buffers for that slot have necessarily all been mapped successfully.
If emac_tx_map_frag() then fails on a later fragment, the err_free_skb
path calls emac_free_tx_buf() to unmap and drop the skb, but leaves
the already-written descriptor memory untouched, and tx_ring->head is
never advanced past old_head (the "tx_ring->head = head" store is
skipped by the goto).
So a slot between old_head and the rolled-back head can be left with
TX_DESC_0_OWN set and buffer_addr_{1,2} pointing at DMA mappings that
emac_free_tx_buf() just tore down, while software considers that slot
free again. The next successful emac_tx_mem_map() call only rebuilds
old_head itself; if the DMA engine auto-advances into the following
descriptor once it finishes old_head's packet, it will fetch that
stale, already-unmapped address.
emac_tx_clean_desc() already treats emac_free_tx_buf() and clearing
the descriptor as a pair when reclaiming completed descriptors; do
the same in the mapping failure path.9dCVE-2026-98591—9.9%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a
memory region of length len starting at offset off into
the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to
the region if so. The check currently subtracts between
skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen
is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the
bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary
pointer of the form *(skb->data + off).
The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF
dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the
dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.
Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if
it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when
calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.9dCVE-2026-98590—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bpf_sock context code generation
Currently, the ctx access code reads the rx_queue_mapping
field with either a 4-byte or 2-byte load. The rest of the bits
in the register are marked known zero by the verifier. However,
the emitted ctx access code places in the register on certain
the special value (-1) using BPF_MOV_IMM64, which gets sign-extended
to turn on all the bits in the register. By shifting this value right,
the program ends up with a value at runtime above what the verifier
assumes is possible.
Fix this by ensuring the read value is as wide as the assumed size.
Use MOV32 instructions instead of MOV64 instructions to keep
the upper bits zero as assumed by the verifier. Also properly report
the size of the destination variable (the bpf_sock field, 4 bytes) instead
of the source (the socket field, 2 bytes).9dCVE-2026-98589—9.3%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
The verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers'
bounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET
registers are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed
valid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory,
where a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.
Reject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that
may mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET
because we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META
or PTR_TO_PACKET_END to the subprog. Since we cannot avoid representing
the pointer in the subprog as PTR_TO_MEM, only permit it if the
subprog is guaranteed not to mutate the packet.9dCVE-2026-98588—11.3%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc
sock_map_alloc() only rejects max_entries == 0 and otherwise allows any
u32 value. sock_map_free() then walks the sks[] array with a signed int
iterator:
int i;
for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++)
struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i];
When a SOCKMAP is created with max_entries = 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX), the
allocation of 32 GiB can succeed on large-memory hosts. During free the
counter reaches 0x80000000, wraps to INT_MIN, is sign-extended by movslq
and turned into a ~16 GiB negative offset from stab->sks, pointing far
below the allocation.
The faulting access is an xchg() write in sock_map_free(). Without
KASAN, the same out-of-bounds write can fault on an unmapped vmalloc page
or corrupt an unrelated allocation if that vmalloc address is populated.
On a KASAN kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y, the shadow check for that
address hits an unmapped shadow page and oopses first:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffff521b59c5a00
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x107/0x190
Call Trace:
sock_map_free+0x93/0x190
map_create+0x68d/0xb30
__sys_bpf+0x21e/0x2e70
Vmcore confirmed stab->map.max_entries == 0xffffffff, stab->sks ==
0xffffc911ace2d000, and the faulting address sks + (s64)INT_MIN * 8
exactly at 0xffffc90dace2d000. The same buggy path is reached on the
normal close()/bpf_map_free_deferred() path whenever such a map is
destroyed.
sock_map_alloc() used to bound its allocation size through
bpf_map_charge_init(), but the bound was dropped when rlimit-based memory
accounting was removed. Reject max_entries > INT_MAX at creation time so
the signed iterator in sock_map_free() never sees a value that would
overflow.
Triggered by syzkaller and reproduced on both a 6.6-based KASAN kernel
and the upstream v7.3-rc2 kernel.9dCVE-2026-98587—8.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: cdev: fix back-transition for iso_resource_auto client resource
The todo member of iso_resource_auto structure represents the state of the
client resource and normally transitions in the following order:
ISO_RES_AUTO_ALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC -> ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC
However, concurrent access from the work item and the file descriptor
release function can cause the state to transition backwards from
ISO_RES_AUTO_DEALLOC to ISO_RES_AUTO_REALLOC.
Prevent the back-transition by checking the current state before
updating it in the work item.9dCVE-2026-98586—6.6%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: hold asoc or transport before mod_timer() in timer handlers
Take the association or transport reference before rearming a timer in the
timer handlers.
The existing code calls mod_timer() before taking the reference needed by
the rearmed timer without holding the sock lock. This creates a race with
timer cleanup: if the timer is deleted after mod_timer() returns but before
the reference is taken, the cleanup path can drop the timer's reference and
destroy the transport or association. The timer handler then takes a
reference on the already freed object and eventually drops it, causing a
refcount underflow.
Hold the object before mod_timer() and drop the reference if mod_timer()
reports that the timer was already pending in timer handlers. Apply the
same ordering to the proto-unreachable path, which can rearm a transport
timer outside the timer handlers without holding the sock lock.9dCVE-2026-98585—5.8%
——2In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: Avoid rounding zero ring sizes
roundup_pow_of_two() is undefined for zero. ethtool permits a zero ring
size to reach the driver, where the minimum-size check should reject it.
Leave zero unchanged while rounding nonzero ring sizes. The minimum-size
check then rejects zero deterministically without changing the established
behavior for other values.9dCVE-2026-98584—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix potential stack infoleak in em_text_dump()
em_text_dump() allocates struct tcf_em_text on the stack without zeroing
it. strscpy() writes the algorithm name and a NUL terminator into
conf.algo[], leaving the remaining bytes uninitialised. nla_put_nohdr()
then copies the full struct to the netlink response.
KMSAN on Linux 7.2-rc6 reports two kernel-infoleak splats from this path,
one triggered via "tc filter show" and one via a raw RTM_GETTFILTER dump:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x1c9/0x2620
nla_put_nohdr+0x83/0x130
em_text_dump+0x291/0x550
Local variable conf created at: em_text_dump+0x5d/0x550
Bytes 168-179 of 199 are uninitialized
I am not certain whether this constitutes a real security problem in
practice: the test was conducted in a controlled KMSAN environment and
the leaked stack bytes may or may not carry sensitive data on actual
production kernels. I am reporting it because KMSAN flagged it as a
kernel-infoleak and the fix is straightforward. I can provide a
userspace reproducer on request.
The original code used strncpy() which zero-pads to the destination size.
Commit b04202d6065c ("net/sched: replace strncpy with strscpy") replaced
it with strscpy(), which does not pad, creating this condition.
Zero-initialising the struct closes it.9dCVE-2026-98583—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nfcmrvl: validate helper command length before pull
The firmware download receive path removes the NCI data header and
reads the helper command before validating the remaining packet length.
A short frame can therefore reach the data access before the malformed
packet is rejected.
Validate the complete helper command length before stripping the NCI
data header.9dCVE-2026-98582—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: st21nfca: validate received frame size
st21nfca_hci_i2c_repack() trims a received frame at its EOF marker
before removing byte stuffing. It then assumes the truncated frame
contains the LLC header and two CRC bytes, and it unconditionally reads
the byte after an escape marker.
A malformed frame can place EOF immediately after the start marker or can
end its data portion with an escape marker. The former leaves too few
bytes for check_crc(), while the latter makes the unstuffing loop read past
the current skb length.
Require the minimum framing bytes both before and after unstuffing. Use
separate input and output cursors while removing byte stuffing, and reject
an escape marker without its encoded byte. This keeps malformed frames
within the received frame boundary before CRC processing.9dCVE-2026-98581—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix list corruption / refcount desync in nfc_llcp_recv_dm()
nfc_llcp_recv_dm() handles DM(NOBOUND)/DM(REJ) for a socket that is still
linked on local->connecting_sockets: it looks the socket up with
nfc_llcp_connecting_sock_get(), sets sk->sk_state = LLCP_CLOSED and
returns, without taking the socket lock and without unlinking the socket
from the connecting_sockets list.
llcp_sock_release() selects the list to unlink from by sk_state: a socket
in LLCP_CONNECTING is unlinked from connecting_sockets, otherwise from the
sockets list. Because recv_dm left the socket physically on
connecting_sockets but in the LLCP_CLOSED state, release() takes the else
branch and calls nfc_llcp_sock_unlink(&local->sockets, sk). That runs
sk_del_node_init() while holding sockets.lock, i.e. it removes the socket
from the connecting_sockets hlist under the wrong lock. A concurrent
connect() linking another socket onto connecting_sockets under
connecting_sockets.lock then mutates the same hlist unserialized, which
corrupts the list and desyncs the sk_add_node()/sk_del_node_init()
sock_hold()/__sock_put() pairing. An unprivileged local process holding
LLCP sockets, with the DM supplied by the remote peer over an established
LLCP link, can drive this to leak kernel sockets without bound (the
mis-decrement goes through the non-freeing __sock_put() path, so the
object is never released), leading to memory exhaustion / DoS.
This is the same class of bug that was fixed in the sibling handler
nfc_llcp_recv_cc() by commit b493ea2765cc ("nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free
race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc()"); recv_dm did not receive the equivalent fix.
Fix it the same way: take lock_sock(), re-check that the socket is still
hashed (release() may have won the race), and for the NOBOUND/REJ case
unlink it from connecting_sockets before moving it to LLCP_CLOSED. The
unlink drops the connecting_sockets membership reference via
sk_del_node_init(), leaving the socket unhashed, so the later
nfc_llcp_sock_unlink() in llcp_sock_release() becomes a no-op and no
double put occurs.9dCVE-2026-98580—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix race condition in accept_queue lifecycle
In nfc_llcp_socket_release(), sockets and listener accept queues are
walked under the local sockets rwlock and bh_lock_sock(). However,
bh_lock_sock() does not synchronise against process-context lock_sock()
held by nfc_llcp_accept_dequeue() during accept(). Because
socket_release() does not check sock_owned_by_user(), both paths can
concurrently unlink and release the same child socket, resulting in
use-after-free or a NULL pointer dereference of child->parent in
nfc_llcp_accept_unlink().
Fix this synchronisation race by having nfc_llcp_socket_release() use
process-context lock_sock() instead of bh_lock_sock():
1. Pop sockets from the local sockets list under the write lock using
nfc_llcp_sock_list_pop() so lock_sock() can be acquired without
holding the rwlock.
2. Because lock_sock() can sleep, defer the final release of the
nfc_llcp_local structure to a workqueue (release_work). This avoids
a sleeping-in-atomic bug when the last local reference is dropped
from softirq context. Additionally, hold a single device reference
on local from registration until final destruction.
3. In nfc_llcp_local_get(), use kref_get_unless_zero() to prevent
resurrecting a local object whose teardown has been scheduled.
4. In llcp_sock_accept(), verify that the listener socket state is still
LLCP_LISTEN after waking from schedule_timeout() to prevent hangs if
the listener is closed concurrently.
5. When unlinking unaccepted child sockets during listener release,
unlink them from local->sockets, call sock_orphan(), and drop their
initial sk_alloc creation reference via sock_put().
6. Make nfc_llcp_accept_unlink() idempotent by guarding parent access with
a NULL check.9dCVE-2026-98579—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix sdreq TLV list leak on parse/alloc/send failure
nfc_genl_llc_sdreq() builds a list of TLV nodes while walking nested
netlink attrs, but 3 error paths (nested-attr parse failure, TLV alloc
ENOMEM, nfc_llcp_send_snl_sdreq() failure) all skip freeing what was
already queued.
Route them through a new free_list label, mirroring the SDRES path in
the same file which already does this. Harmless on the success path
too -- send_snl_sdreq() drains the list as it moves nodes, so it's
already empty by the time free_list runs.9dCVE-2026-98578—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: st21nfca: validate ISO15693 inventory length
The ISO15693 inventory helper removes a two-byte prefix without checking
that it exists, then accepts a one-byte remainder before reading data[1] as
the DSFID.
Require the prefix and at least two remaining bytes before copying the UID
data and reading the DSFID.9dCVE-2026-98577—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix WKS SAP hijacking via prefix match in nfc_llcp_wks_sap()
nfc_llcp_wks_sap() compares only service_name_len bytes, so a short
service_name like "u" matches longer WKS strings like "urn:nfc:sn:snep".
Fix by requiring exact length match before strncmp().9dCVE-2026-98576—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix slab-out-of-bounds reads when logging service names
nfc_llcp_wks_sap() and nfc_llcp_build_sdreq_tlv() pass non-null-
terminated strings to pr_debug() using the %s format specifier.
The buffers are allocated via kmemdup() or come from netlink
attributes and are not guaranteed to be null-terminated, causing
__dynamic_pr_debug() to read beyond the allocated region:
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in __dynamic_pr_debug
Fix both call sites by using %.*s with the explicit length to limit
the output to the actual length of the string.9dCVE-2026-98575—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: fix OOB read in pn533_acr122_is_rx_frame_valid()
frame->ccid.datalen is read directly from the USB response frame
and used, unchecked, as an index into frame->data[]. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can set this field to an arbitrary value,
causing the driver to read far outside the received buffer.
Bound ccid.datalen against the maximum possible ACR122 frame size
before using it. This replaces the existing datalen == 0 check,
since datalen < 2 already covers that case and additionally
rejects datalen == 1, which would still underflow the
"datalen - 2" offset used below.9dCVE-2026-98574—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: stop Tx NAPI before disabling the queues
bcmgenet_netif_stop() and the Wake-on-LAN branch of bcmgenet_suspend()
both disable the Tx queues first and stop Tx NAPI several steps later. A
completion in flight calls netif_tx_wake_queue() in between, and nothing
stops the queue again, so a transmit can reach the rings after they have
been freed.
Close is safe because dev_deactivate_many() stops the qdisc first.
bcmgenet_suspend() does not, so stop Tx NAPI before the queues on both
paths.
KASAN on a Raspberry Pi CM4, driven from an MTU change because suspend
freezes user space before the callback runs:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bcmgenet_xmit+0x17f8/0x2258
Write of size 8 at addr ffffff8055844a68 by task ksoftirqd/0/14
bcmgenet_xmit+0x17f8/0x2258
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13c/0x588
sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x340
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1190/0x38489dCVE-2026-98573—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6()
skb_maybe_pull_tail() subtracts skb_headlen(skb) from the unsigned max
argument and passes the result to __pskb_pull_tail() as a signed int. The
function does not ensure that max is at least skb_headlen(skb).
This can happen while parsing IPv6 extension headers when an skb already
has a linear area larger than MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN. Once the parser needs data
beyond the linear area, max - skb_headlen(skb) wraps and is converted to a
negative delta. __pskb_pull_tail() then passes that negative length to
skb_copy_bits(), where it can become a very large copy length.
Pass the requested length itself as the pull bound at the three
extension-header call sites, so the delta can no longer go negative.9dCVE-2026-98572—11.3%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix immediate JMP JEQ/JNE on MIPS32
An addu instruction was emitted instead of addiu, causing the immediate
value 1 to be interpreted as register $at. This made the comparison
result invalid when the immediate operand was negative. Note that $at
is mapped to BPF_REG_AX, which is used for constant blinding.
Fix the instruction to use the immediate form.
Found with test_bpf on MIPS32r1 emulated by QEMU.9dCVE-2026-98571—9.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: clear stale buf->page after recycling on skb build failure
In stmmac_rx(), when napi_build_skb() fails the descriptor page is
recycled back to the page pool with page_pool_recycle_direct(), but
buf->page is left pointing at the recycled page, unlike every other
consumption site in the function which clears the pointer after handing
the page away.
With the stale pointer stmmac_rx_refill() skips the replacement
allocation and programs the already-recycled page back into the RX
descriptor.
Clear buf->page on the napi_build_skb() failure path to keep the buffer
lifecycle consistent with the other consumption sites.9dCVE-2026-98570—8.5%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: keep room for the mac header in dst_dev_overhead()
The seg6, ioam6 and rpl lwtunnels size their skb_cow_head() request as
the length they are about to push plus dst_dev_overhead(), then push the
new headers and rebuild the mac header below them with
skb_mac_header_rebuild(). That rebuild needs skb->mac_len of headroom,
but dst_dev_overhead() leaves LL_RESERVED_SPACE() of the egress device,
16 bytes for plain Ethernet.
Where the mac header is longer than that, as it is on ingress through a
VLAN device with reorder_hdr off, the rebuild runs out of room:
skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len) computes a negative offset,
stores it unchecked in the u16 skb->mac_header, and the memmove that
follows writes skb->mac_len bytes about 64 KB past skb->head.
Forwarding plain ping6 traffic through such a device reproduces it on
all five seg6 encapsulation modes and on the rpl and ioam6 inline paths;
skb->mac_header comes back as 65534 on a 704-byte head.
Return the larger of the two. The helper already returns skb->mac_len
when it has no dst, so this only makes the other branch agree, and it
covers every caller rather than each call site in turn.9dCVE-2026-98569—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip_gre: Reject enabling collect metadata through changelink
ipgre_netlink_parms() can enable collect_md on an existing GRE, GRETAP
or ERSPAN device. Unlike newlink, changelink does not enforce metadata
tunnel uniqueness. Converting a non-metadata device can therefore
replace the metadata receive entry for another device of the same type
in the same netns. Deleting either device then clears the shared entry,
breaking metadata receive lookup for the surviving device.
If parameter validation fails after collect_md is set, deleting the
modified device can also clear an entry it never owned.
Reject enabling metadata mode in both changelink callbacks before any
encapsulation or tunnel parameters are modified. Allow requests that
repeat the metadata attribute on an existing metadata device.9dCVE-2026-98568—9.8%
——3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use one headroom snapshot for neighbour replies
vxlan_na_create() samples LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to size the reply skb and then
samples it again to reserve headroom. A concurrent vxlan_changelink() can
update needed_headroom between the two reads, creating a TOCTOU race. The
second value can exceed the allocation and make the Ethernet header write out
of bounds.
The race is reproducible on the unpatched kernel. It occurred when
vxlan_na_create() generated a neighbour reply while vxlan_changelink() changed
the link headroom. KASAN caught a four-byte write two bytes beyond a 704-byte
skbuff_small_head allocation.
Snapshot the headroom once and use that value for both allocation and
reservation.9dCVE-2026-98567—12.0%
——4In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: xps: reject an out of range traffic class
Only the entries below dev->num_tc are valid in dev->tc_to_txq[], and
dev->prio_tc_map[] may only name classes below it. netdev_set_num_tc()
lowers dev->num_tc without touching either array.
netdev_txq_to_tc() walks all TC_MAX_QUEUE slots and
netdev_get_prio_tc_map() returns the entry as it stands, so a leftover
entry is handed out as a traffic class >= dev->num_tc. Taking that
class from netdev_txq_to_tc(), __netif_set_xps_queue() rejects only a
negative one and indexes an XPS map sized for dev->num_tc classes:
tci = j * num_tc + tc;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(new_dev_maps->attr_map[tci], map);
attr_map[] holds nr_ids * num_tc entries and j runs over the ids named
in the mask, so a class that is not below num_tc pushes tci past the end
of the map for the last ids and the store overruns it.
Any caller that lowers num_tc leaves such entries behind, and
mqprio_destroy() tears down with netdev_set_num_tc(dev, 0) rather than
netdev_reset_tc(). After mqprio with 8 classes then 1, tc_to_txq[1..7]
still describe txq 1..7. The splat is from an XPS write to txq 2 on a
veth with 8 rx queues: attr_map[] has 8 * 1 entries, tci = j + 2, and
j == 6 stores one past the end of the 88-byte map:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88813016bc58 by task xps_oob/634
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
xps_rxqs_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1880)
netdev_queue_attr_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1390)
Allocated by task 634:
__kmalloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:5439)
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2937)
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 88-byte region [ffff88813016bc00, ffff88813016bc58)
Reject a class the map has no room for.9d